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HONG KONG'S 1997 TRANSITION: U.N.
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS TO
GUARANTEE HONG KONG'S HUMAN




On July 1, 1997 the British handed Hong Kong back to the Chi-
nese. As I walked through Sheung Wan, Hong Kong on that day, I
wondered what impact the transition would have on Hong Kong resi-
dents. Had they heard of China's promises?' Were they concerned that
China would not uphold these promises? 2 I witnessed the fanfare and
festivities of the transition. I spoke with many people who had different
views on its effects. One taxi driver expressed his fear that over the
next fifty years, based on China's governmental influence, he would
have to live in fear of every word he spoke and the possibility that he
could be snatched up and detained as a prisoner. Contrarily, a member
of the legal community shrugged his shoulders and expressed passing
interest in the effects of the transition. What are the reasons for the
public's uncertainty? My curiosity was provoked. Were there any sort
of legal mechanisms to guarantee that the promises made in the inter-
national agreements pertinent to the transition, the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law, would be kept?
China committed itself to the Joint Declaration: Agreement on the
Future of Hong Kong (Joint Declaration)3 and the Basic Law of the
University of Denver, College of Law, J.D. 1993; Wellesley College, B.A. 1993. I
would like to thank Garret Chan, Julian Ha, Robert Huss, Maria Mitchell, Thomas
Mitchell, Celia Taylor, and Richard Wong for their support and guidance.
1. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
2. See The Committee on International Human Rights, Preserving the Rule of Law
in Hong Kong After July 1, 1997. A Report of a Mission of Inquiry, RECORD, May, 1996, at
357, 359 [hereinafter RECORD]. "The advent of Chinese rule has raised concern beyond
Hong Kong's borders about future rights of people to be free of government arbitrariness
in Hong Kong; and that concern, in turn, focuses sharply on preservation and modification
of its system of justice, the rule of law and independence of its judges and lawyers." Id.
3. Joint Declaration: Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, P.R.C.-
U.K., 23 I.L.M. 1366 [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. See infra notes 58-73 and accompa-
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Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China (Basic Law)4 to appease the rest of the world and to provide as-
surance for a smooth transition for Hong Kong back to Chinese rule.5
Pursuant to these agreements, China promised that Hong Kong will be
basically autonomous and that the rule of law in Hong Kong will re-
main virtually unchanged for fifty years after the transition.6 This
would mean that those laws in place prior to the transition would re-
main applicable for fifty years after the transition, thereby assuring
certain protections to the citizens of Hong Kong.7 It is difficult to pre-
dict, however, whether China will actually uphold these agreements.
8
Some argue that, at the very least, China has dubious intentions
towards upholding these legal agreements. China's scarred reputation
of not upholding agreements strengthens this argument.9 Furthermore,
nying text.
4. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People's
Republic of China (April 4, 1990) [hereinafter Basic Law]. See infra notes 74-87 and ac-
companying text.
5. See generally RECORD, supra note 2. Basic Law, supra note 4, at preamble; Mi-
chael C. Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region: A Framework for Analysis, 34 COLUM, J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301, 304 (1996) (stating
that the intent was to provide a "seamless transition where ... people would wake up on
July 1, 1997 and the only visible change would be the flag..."). But see id. at 304 (stating
that "[d]reams of a smooth transition have evaporated."). The reasons for the evaporation
started with Tiananmen massacre and continued into the 1992 proposals by Chris Patten
for democratic reform. Id.
6. See Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at art. 1. See also Basic Law, supra note 4, at
ch. I, art. 8; Jin Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, "One Country, Two Systems," Three Law
Families, and Four Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Conflicts of Laws in
China, 5 DuKE J.COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 294 (1995).
7. See generally Robert C. Berring, Farewell to All That, 19 LOY. L.A. IN'TL & COMP.
L.J. 431 (1997) (discussing the difference between the Chinese legal system and the Hong
Kong rule of law).
8. The implication is that if China does not uphold these agreements, the human
rights of the Hong Kong people are at stake. Interview with Gladys Li, Former Chairman
of the Hong Kong Bar Association, in Hong Kong, SAR (July 7, 1997) [hereinafter Gladys
Li Interview]; Angela Young, Hong Kong: CD Products Market, Industry Sector Analysis,
August 20, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 9850761 (indicating that although it
is impossible to predict the future of Hong Kong, there are reasons for optimism to believe
that China will uphold its agreements). See generally Berring, supra note 7 (discussing
how superficially the agreement seems to clearly indicate China's positive intention but at
a closer look, Berring contends that not only will the current system probably not survive,
it won't survive).
9. See Donna Deese Skeen, Can Capitalism Survive Under Communist Rule? The
Effect of Hong Kong's Reversion to the People's Republic of China in 1997, 29 INT'L LAW
175, 178-79 (1995). The Joint Declaration for Hong Kong is compared to China's agree-
ment with Tibet. The Tibet agreement guaranteed regional autonomy for Tibet as a
method to securing the "peaceful liberation of Tibet." Despite this agreement, Tibet has,
instead, been subject to Chinese rule and has been severely oppressed. Similarly, China
violated its agreement to import wheat from the United States. See Patricia Homan
Palumbo, Comment, Analysis of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of
Hong Kong: What Do They Guarantee the People of Hong Kong After 1997? 6 CONN. J.
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the legal policies of China do not favor ensuring international agree-
ments;1 0 and China's human rights' tradition towards its citizens is re-
plete with violations." Other people argue that China has already vio-
lated parts of these agreements. 12 Possible violations range from
abolishment of the Legislative Council' 3 to cancellation of a series of
laws that ensured civil and political rights in Hong Kong.
14
In light of this, the international community will likely act to en-
sure China's compliance. What mechanisms are available to do this? If
such mechanisms fail and China violates the terms of the agreements,
are there mechanisms for punishment?
INT'L. L. 667, 687, 695 (1991).
10. See Paul Vitrano, Hong Kong 1997: Can the People's Republic of China Be Com-
pelled to Abide by the Joint Declaration, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 445, 452
(1995). "[The PRC adheres to the international legal doctrine of rebus sic stantibus... if a
'fundamental change of circumstances' occurs, a state can unilaterally terminate its obli-
gations under an agreement. The PRC's 1956 suspension of part of the Sin-Soviet Agree-
ment on Cultural Cooperation is an example of China's application of rebus sic stantibus."
Id. See also Anthony Neoh, Hong Kong's Future: The View of a Hong Kong Lawyer, 22
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 309, 318-20, 323 (1992) (discussing the Chinese concept of unequal
treaties and the Five Principals of Peaceful Co-existence and how China may view the
treaties signed between Great Britain and the Quing Dynasty from the 1800s as unequal
and therefore invalid).
11. See Davis, supra note 5, at 317-18 (indicating that "those searching for evidence
of respect for human rights, especially civil and political rights, in mainland Chinese offi-
cial practices search in vain."). In China human rights are given second rate status to the
duties to which they are associated. If the duties are fulfilled by the citizens, then the
state grants the human rights as it deems necessary and appropriate. Id. Accord Alice H.
Amsden et al., China, The United States and Human Rights, DISSENT, Spring 1997, at 7;
Robin Reichman-Coad, Human Rights Violations in China: A United States Response, 15
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 163 (1994) (discussing the human rights abuses in China
and what the United States' response should be). See generally Kelly M. Brown, Execu-
tion for Profit? A Constitutional Analysis of China's Practice of Harvesting Executed Pris-
oner's Organs, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1029 (1996) (providing a brief discussion of the
policies of China and their impact on human rights). See also U.S. Department of State,
China Country Report on Human Rights Practice for 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 2000) < http:
//www.usis.usemb.se/human/humanl998/china.html>.
12. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8. See also infra, notes 45-48 and accompanying
text. See generally U.S. Department of State, Hong Kong Report on Human Rights Prac-
tice for 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/humanl998/
hongkong.html>. Originally, Hong Kong law maintained a provision that allowed for the
government to refuse to register an organization that was "incompatible with peace, wel-
fare, or good order." However, the freedom of peaceful assembly and association in Hong
Kong was "practiced without significant interference". So in 1992, the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment repealed the provision. This allowed for demonstrations without government
interference. However, the PRC has negated that action by including language similar to
the repealed provision in the Basic Law.
13. See infra notes 90-100, and accompanying text.
14. Christopher Patten, Governor of Hong Kong, Our Next Five Years: The Agenda
for Hong Kong, Address at the Opening of the 1992-93 Session of the Legislative Council
(Oct. 7, 1992).
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Many international actors might have a role to play.15 However,
the focus of this piece is the United Nations and its ability to encourage
China to fulfill its human rights promises through the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 16 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).17 These
covenants are made applicable to Hong Kong through provisions of the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
This article is structured as follows: Part II introduces the general
history of relations between China and Great Britain including a brief
synopsis of the interplay of relevant agreements. Part III provides a
more detailed analysis of the agreements pertinent to the Hong Kong
transition; the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Part IV identifies
the need for this analysis. Part V analyzes the relevant U.N. covenants.
II. HISTORY OF CHINA AND GREAT BRITAIN'S RELATIONSHIP
The history of relations between the United Kingdom and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong is critical to an under-
standing of the potential problems the world community faces in trying
to make China comply with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.' 8
At the beginning of the 19th century, Hong Kong was a small par-
cel of rocky land.19 It was undeveloped
20 and had a small population. 2'
15. In 1995, the Executive Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York sent a mission of inquiry to Hong Kong. The purpose of this mission was to answer
questions regarding the July 1, 1997 transfer. Beyond obtaining answers for their ques-
tions, the members of the mission determined that the "rule of law in Hong Kong will re-
quire careful world-wide monitoring," RECORD, supra note 2, at 358-59, 387. Resulting
from their conclusions, the mission developed a "proposal for an on-going relationship be-
tween the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Hong Kong Legal Com-
munity. Id at 388. Through joint conferences and other reporting methods, the joint
Hong Kong and New York committee would channel important information regarding the
status of the law in Hong Kong. See id. at 388-89; see also Robert J. Guttman, Etienne
Reuter: Head of the European Commission Delegation to Hong Kong, EUROPE, July 17,
1997, at 22 (discussing the European Commissions role in securing Hong Kong post tran-
sition). Other possible international actors are Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch: Asia Watch, and other non-governmental organizations.
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), art 6, §
1 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See infra, notes 124-167 and accompanying text.
17. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 6 I.L.M. 360
(1967) [hereinafter ICESCR]. See infra, notes 201-232 and accompanying text.
18. See Davis, supra note 5, at 303.
19. See Keith M. Harris, The Hong Kong Accord as a Model For Dealing With Other
Disputed Territories, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348, 349 (1986); Kristen Choo, Zero
Hour for Hong Kong, 83 ABA J. 70, 70 (1997).
20. Harris, supra note 19, at 349. But see Choo, supra note 19, at 71 (stating that
Hong Kong is the "planet's eighth-largest trading economy").
21. See John H. Henderson, The Reintegration of Hong Kong into the People's Repub-
lic of China: What It Means to Hong Kong's Future Prosperity, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
503, 506 n.4 (1995) (stating that Hong Kong's population in 1851 was about 30,000);
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Trading conflicts between western nations and China provoked the
Opium War of 1840, the First Anglo-Chinese War.22 China's attempt to
halt the British import of opium into China, further aggravated the con-
flicts between China and Great Britain.23 After much wrangling, the
Convention in the Treaty of Nanking of 1842 expanded the rights of the
British to provide imports to China, compensated the British for the de-
stroyed opium, and established Great Britain's possession of Hong Kong
"in perpetuity."24 On June 26, 1843, Hong Kong formally came into
British possession following the conclusion of the Opium War. 25
The Second Anglo Chinese War occurred in 1860 and Great Britain
acquired the southern tip of the Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters
Island.26 At the end of that century, China, greatly weakened by the
Sino-Japanese War, was forced to make additional concessions to Great
Britain.27 Great Britain leased the remainder of Kowloon from China in
1898 with a ninety-nine year lease of the "New Territories" designated
to end on July 1, 1997.28
Through the years, China has continued to nurse the open wound
created by Britain's acquisition of the Hong Kong territories. 29 None-
theless, since 1898 Hong Kong has been a British colony and the laws
and policies of the United Kingdom have governed Hong Kong.30 Laws
Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 301 n.80 (providing statistics that "Hong Kong covers ap-
proximately 412 square miles... with a population in 1985 of 5.4 million"); Choo, supra
note 19, at 71 (indicating that Hong Kong's population in 1997 was 6.3 million).
22. See Skeen, supra note 9, at 176-77 (discussing the politics behind Britain's opium
trade and Britain's acquisition of Hong Kong).
23. Id.
24. Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Gr. Brit., 30 BRIT. FOR. ST. PAP. 389, 93
CONSOL. T.S. 465; Skeen, supra note 9, at 176-77 (quoting Jan Morris, Hong Kong, at 18).
25. See Elizabeth G. Bynum, Hong and China: The 1997 Transition, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 299 (1996); RECORD, supra note 2, at 357, 362; Henderson, supra note
21, at 349-350
26. Convention of Friendship, Oct. 24, 1860, China- Gr. Brit., 50 BRIT. FOR. ST. PAP.
10, 123 CONSOL. T.S. 71; See Skeen, supra note 9, at 176-77.
27. See Henderson, supra note 21, at 509.
28. Convention of Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898,
China-Gr. Brit., 90 BRIT. FOR. ST. PAP. 17, 186 CONSOL. T.S. 310. See also Vitrano, supra
note 10, at 446.
29. See Henderson, supra note 21, at 510-11 (discussing China's strong desire to re-
unite all of China and China's belief that Hong Kong was acquired by Britain through
.unequal treaties"); Kieron Flynn, HK Says Nothing Changed After 100 Days, But Doubt-
ers Remain, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Oct. 7, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL
13409085; Berring, supra note 7, at 433.
30. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 357, 362. Consequently, Hong Kong's legal system
is identical to the English legal system. Hong Kong's body of law, prior to the reversion,
included statutory provisions and common law doctrines, for example, letter patent, royal
instructions, & colonial regulations. See Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 296-97. After
July 1, 1997, the effect of the enactment of laws in Parliament on Hong Kong became ob-
solete. See Denis G. Brock, Hong Kong, in ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 39
(Charles Platte & William G. Horton, ed., 1992) [hereinafter Platto & Horton].
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enacted in Parliament in England either directly affected Hong Kong
law or indirectly affected Hong Kong law via statutory implementa-
tion.
31
In 1949, communism was established in China with the success of
the Chinese Communist Revolution.3 2 China established a civil law
system, but this system was unable to replace the traditional beliefs of
Confucianism.33 A communist Shanghai became less attractive as the
primary trade port into China.34 Instead, Hong Kong rapidly became
the center of trade with China. 35 The 1950s were significant years for
Hong Kong as it increased its importance in the international commu-
nity. 36
Hong Kong's vulnerability to the influences of China became obvi-
ous when, as a result of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revo-
lution in China, Hong Kong experienced societal upheavals. 37 Since
Hong Kong had become an integral part of international trade and the
31. Since the Hong Kong legal system was derived from the British legal system, the
Letters Patent are the core constitutional documents. Within the Letters Patent are the
Royal Instructions to the Governor and the power for the legislature. Hong Kong law is
constituted by [1)] "statutes made by the Governor by and with the consent of the Legisla-
ture, 2) the common law of England and rules of equity except insofar as they are oppres-
sive; 3) Act of Parliament specifically incorporated by reference in local legislation; 4) Act
of Parliament which either expressly or by necessary implication applies to Hong Kong;
and 5) Orders-in-Council made by the Queen on the advice of her Privy Council." Neoh,
supra note 10, at 339. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 5, at 306 (discussing British Colonial
Rule, which was characterized by authoritarian colonialism with acknowledged strength
in economic success, laisez faire policies, a free press, the rule of law, etc.); Hong Kong:
New IP Regime In Hong Kong, BUS. MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10293455 (discussing whether intellectual property regulations will continue after the
transition); Ann Jordan, Lost in the Translation: Two Legal Cultures, The Common Law
Judiciary and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 30
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 335, 337 (1997) (stating that this common law system applied by
Britain "sets out objective procedures that, under a rule of law system, are applied equally
to everyone... [and] has been accepted by the majority of Hong Kong people...").
32. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 363; see also Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 289
(indicating that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 and it has
been a "unitary socialist legal system with a single legal district").
33. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 338. Confucianism is based on complicated rituals
and codes of conduct based on etiquette. Id.
34. See Elizabeth Yee, Hong Kong and China in 1997: An Examination of Possible
Legal and Economic Implications for United States Business, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
595, 595-96 (1996).
35. See generally id. Currently, Hong Kong "is an important international financial
center, second only to Tokyo in the Pacific region... Hong Kong is among the top twelve
traders in the world. Its Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in 1989 was H.K. $85, 325
(U.S. $11,000).. ." Neoh, supra note 10, at 310.
36. See Yee, supra note 34, at 595 (discussing Hong Kong's role as "the Pearl of the
Orient"). See also RECORD, supra note 2, at 363.
37. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 364; see also Skeen, supra note 9, at 192 (stating
that Hong Kong is presently the "best gateway to China', however, Hong Kong's stock
market is "vulnerable to internal Chinese politics.").
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date for Hong Kong's transition back to China loomed closer, Hong
Kong residents and international onlookers became concerned about the
ground rules for the transition. 38
This concern provided the push to Great Britain and China to sign
the Sino-British Joint Declaration, 39 the reversion agreement, on De-
cember 19, 1984.40 The Joint Declaration is the precursor to the Basic
Law, 41 the final plan of law and government for post-transition Hong
Kong. Requirements for the Basic Law stem from the Joint Declara-
tion's demands that the Basic Law must enumerate and ensure all the
guarantees provided in the Joint Declaration. 42 Between the time that
the Joint Declaration took effect on December 19, 1984 and the last day
of British rule on June 30, 1997, the Government of the United King-
dom was responsible for the "administration of Hong Kong with the ob-
ject of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social
stability."43 The government of China was to cooperate towards this
end.
4 4
38. See Harris, supra note 19, at 350 (indicating that one of the primary concerns was
the future of property transactions which were dictated by a 15 years lease plan, until the
end of the United Kingdom's lease of part of the Hong Kong territory); Davis, supra note
5, at 310-11.
39. See generally Joint Declaration, supra note 3. Not every article of the Joint Dec-
laration will be discussed since certain aspects of the agreement are more relevant to this
discussion than others; therefore not every article of the Declaration will be itemized.
40. See Vitrano supra note 10, at 446. See also Harris, supra note 19, at 350-51.
41. The Basic Law, supra note 4. The Basic Law was designed to take effect on July
1, 1997 and to last for 50 years.
42. See Yee, supra note 34 at 600; Vitrano, supra note 10, at 447, 455-56. The Joint
Declaration was the original agreement between the United Kingdom and China. The
two countries agreed, in the Joint Declaration, to the content of the Basic Law. The Joint
Declaration provides that the Basic Law will be established after the Joint Declaration
but will contain all of the parameters agreed to in the Joint Declaration. Joint Declara-
tion, supra note 3, at arts. III, XII. The Basic Law was created by the Basic Law Drafting
Commission, comprised of 59 people, all of whom were appointed by the government of
China and less than 50% of whom were from Hong Kong. See Harris, supra note 19, at
352. This deserves skepticism because a group of people hand picked by China and not
adequately representative of the Hong Kong people created a document for Hong Kong to
preserve Hong Kong's current system. It is difficult to imagine that this group would not
be biased in favor of granting more power to China than originally assumed in the Joint
Declaration, to take away Hong Kong's rights. Pursuant to this view, the group created
the Basic Law, which is unclear and leaves flexibility for multiple interpretations in favor
of granting more authority to China. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
43. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at art. IV. See generally, Vitrano, supra note 10,
at 449 (discussing the reforms attempted by Governor Chris Patten in Hong Kong follow-
ing 1992 and prior to July 1, 1997).
44. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at introduction, art. IV (stating: IT]he govern-
ment of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with
the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and
that the Government of the People's Republic of China will give its cooperation in this
connection."). See generally, RECORD, supra note 2, at 367, 369 (discussing Annex I); Har-
ris, supra note 19, at 351 (indicating that before June 30, 1997 "the British Government
1999
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The 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in China created a tremen-
dous scare in Hong Kong. The British colonial government responded
by passing the Bill of Rights Ordinance (BRO) and amending their cur-
rent laws to comply with the BRO. 45 The Hong Kong BRO incorporated
the ICCPR into Hong Kong rule of law. 46 To avoid protest from China
that the BRO violated the Joint Declaration, Great Britain copied the
ICCPR almost identically. 47 China was nonetheless agitated and indi-
cated that the BRO was unnecessary because the Basic Law already
provided adequate protection of rights.48
In 1994, Governor Patten established limited economic and political
reforms, including electoral reforms.49 The reforms were to "safeguard
Hong Kong's way of life, the way of life set out in page after page of the
Joint Declaration.. ." and to provide for more democracy post-1997. 50
On July 1, 1997 Hong Kong transitioned from British colonial rule
to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China (SAR).51 No
[was] responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and
preserving its economic prosperity and social stability, and China will cooperate in that
effort.") This provision is the counter argument to China's claim that the political and
economic reforms instituted by Patten in 1992 were contrary to the Joint Declaration.
The United Kingdom maintained that movement towards democracy was necessary for
the administration of Hong Kong, and that China should cooperate. In fact, China is vio-
lating the Joint Declaration by denying the legitimacy of the United Kingdom's actions to
administer to Hong Kong's needs.
45. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 378; Choo, supra note 19, at 72.
46. See Skeen, supra note 9, at 199-200; Jordan, supra note 31, at 368. The Bill of
Rights Ordinance (BRO) was Hong Kong's first written bill of rights. See RECORD, supra
note 2, at 378.
47. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 365. The Joint Declaration may be violated by a
fundamental change in the Hong Kong rule of law. Since the ICCPR remained applicable
to Hong Kong, according to Article 39 of the Basic Law, China should not have had any
qualms. See RECORD, supra note 2, at 379. China, nonetheless, was troubled by the BRO.
See id. at 379-80 (indicating China's fundamental issue was with Article 3(a) of the BRO
because it nullified any previous laws that contradicted the BRO).
48. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 367-68.
49. See Choo, supra note 19, at 72. Prior to 1994, the Governor of Hong Kong was
always nominated by London and 39 out of 60 members of LegCo were elected. Vitrano,
supra note 10, at 449.
50. Vitrano, supra note 10, at 449 (quoting a speech given by Governor Patten and
discussing the impact of the reforms).
51. See Harris, supra note 19, at 351-52 (stating that Hong Kong is to be restored to
Chinese sovereignty effective July 1, 1997 and will become a special administrative region
(SAR)). Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution provides for the establishment of a special
administrative region. See also Daniel R. Fung, Foundation for the Survival of the Rule of
Law in Hong Kong - The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty, 1 UCLA. J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 283, 288 (1996). See also RECORD, supra note 2, at 367, n.14. See also infra
note 55 and accompanying test (indicating that part of the motivation for the establish-
ment of Special Administrative Region is the "one country, two systems" policy); Jordan,
supra note 31, at 351-52 (stating that an "SAR is not just an economic unit distinct from
the rest of the country. It is a localized political-legal entity and a socio-economic reality
differentiated from the general socialist system but forming part of a unitary state...").
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longer subject to the administration of Great Britain, Hong Kong law
became administered by China based on Deng Xiaoping's "one country,
two systems" policy.5 2 This policy was guaranteed in the Sino-British
Joint Declaration and promulgated in the Basic Law.5 3 In the past,
when the British have ceded a territory, they have established a clear
and detailed plan for the change.5 4 The usual and most ideal procedure
would have been for the existing legislature in Hong Kong, the Legisla-
tive Council (LegCo),5 5 to provide rules for the new incoming legisla-
ture. However, China would not allow this type of conversion.56 In-
stead, the new government of Hong Kong started with a new plan of
law, the Basic Law.
57
III. AGREEMENTS PERTINENT TO THE HONG KONG TRANSITION
A. The Joint Declaration: An International Agreement
The Sino-British Joint Declaration is a treaty expressing the gen-
eral agreement that the common goal of the government of the United
Kingdom and the government of the People's Republic of China is for
China to resume authority over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997.58 Ratified
52. Deng Xiaoping established the "one country, two systems" policy in 1978 in re-
sponse to China's controversy with Taiwan. See Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 289. The
Joint Declaration, supra note 6, art. III, para. 5. Under this policy Hong Kong will main-
tain its capitalist system despite the fact that China, its sovereign power, is a socialist
system. See Yee, supra note 34, at 600.
53. The "one country, two systems" policy is guaranteed in the Sino-British Joint Dec-
laration and promulgated in the Basic Law. See Yee, supra note 34, at 600. The Joint
Declaration was the original agreement between the United Kingdom and China. The
two countries agreed, in the Joint Declaration, to the content of the Basic Law. The Joint
Declaration provides that the Basic Law will be established after the Joint Declaration
but will contain all of the parameters agreed to in the Joint Declaration.
54. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8. See, e.g., Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of
Successful Treason: Coup D'Etat & Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 49, 60 (1994)
(discussing the extensive legal provisions made by the British government for the transi-
tion of Southern Rhodesia from a British colony to an independent nation); see also id. at
90-91 (discussing the legal mechanisms provided by the British government for establish-
ing the government and laws of Lesotho when it gained independence from Britain).
55. The Legislative Council was the legislative body existing in Hong Kong prior to
July 1, 1997.
56. Glayds Li Interview, supra note 8. See also Davis, supra note 5, at 305 n.7 and
accompanying text (discussing that although China's original intent was to keep negotia-
tions between itself and Great Britain, Hong Kong had an un-severable interest in the
process and therefore this tripartite relationship was termed the three legged stool).
57. Id. I believe that China's motivation was to ensure that they had the maximum
opportunity to interpret and configure the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law to their
advantage. Since the Basic Law is open to varied interpretation and interpretation by
China alone (following the transition Great Britain no longer has any influence), much of
the autonomy and guarantee of basic rights for Hong Kong citizens could vanish.
58. Joint Declaration, supra note 3. The issues that developed during these discus-
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in 1985,59 the Joint Declaration provides the framework for the transi-
tion of control agreed to by China and the United Kingdom, 60 for the in-
teractions between Hong Kong and China after the transition occurs
(committing the "one country, two systems" polity to writing),6' and for
the establishment of the Basic Law.
62
The Joint Declaration institutes the general framework agreed to
by China, 63 in which China guarantees a high degree of autonomy and
basic human rights for Hong Kong and its citizens, except with regard
to foreign affairs and defense affairs.6 4 According to the Joint Declara-
tion, "the laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically
unchanged"65 and "[tihe current social and economic systems in Hong
Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style."6 6 The Joint
Declaration guarantees basic human rights such as freedom of person,
sions related to the differences between the capitalist Hong Kong society, which provides
a high degree of personal and economic freedoms, and the communist government of
China and its socialist society. See Harris, supra note 19, at 349 (indicating that the as-
surance that the "one country-two systems" concept would be available helped to mitigate
controversies that developed during the discussions that led to the Joint Declaration and
helped ensure adoption of the Joint Declaration).
59. Subsequent to being signed, the Joint Declaration was registered with the United
Nations. See Fung, supra note 51, at 289-90. Some scholars argue that registration with
the U.N. was "merely a symbolic gesture" by China to the people of Hong Kong. As an
enforcement mechanism, it is insubstantial. See Vitrano, supra note 10, at 458-59.
60. See generally Harris, supra note 19, at 351-52 (stating that the Joint Declaration
features Britain's agreement to "restore' Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty effective July
1, 1997.. .and during the transitional period prior to June 30, 1997, the British govern-
ment is responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining
and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability, and China will cooperate in
this effort.. .upon China's resumption of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong becomes a spe-
cial administrative region (SAR), as provided in [A]rticle 31 of the Chinese Constitution."
For fifty years Hong Kong will be a "quasi-autonomous entity of a semi-capitalist nature
within the framework of a Socialist polity", in other words, the "one country, two systems"
idea.
61. See Yee, supra note 34, at 600. See also Huang & Qian, supra note 6, at 289.
62. See Yee, supra note 34, at 600; see also Vitrano, supra note 10, at 445 (indicating
that the "one country-two systems" policy has been promoted by China for the conversion
of both Hong Kong and Macau back to the PRC).
63. See Harris, supra note 19, at 350-51.
64. See Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at introduction, art. III, para. 2 (stating that
foreign and defense affairs are the PRC's responsibility). See generally Fung, supra note
51, at 290-91 (elaborating that Hong Kong "will maintain her present freedoms and life-
styles as well as her own political, economic, social, cultural, legal, and judicial systems
which are fundamentally different and separate from those of the rest of China. Capital-
ism will continue to be the prevailing economic system. Socialism, as state policy, will not
be applied.").
65. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at art. III, para. 3. "[tlhe Hong Kong SAR will be
vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication." Id. In other words, the current legal system in Hong Kong, which is de-
rived from the English legal system, will remain basically unchanged. See also Basic
Law, supra note 4, at art. 8 (discussing the laws in force).
66. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at introduction, art. III, para. 5.
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speech, assembly, correspondence, academic research, and association. 67
In theory, the "one country, two systems" policy provides a means to
this end.
The Annexes of the Joint Declaration elaborate on the basic points
outlined in the main body of the Joint Declaration. 68 Annex I, part 1
provides in part, that China will enact a Basic Law that ensures that
the capitalist system of Hong Kong will remain unchanged for fifty
years after the transition69 and provides guidelines for achieving.
70
Annex I, part II provides the laws to be enforced in Hong Kong.
They include the Basic Law and the laws "previously in force in Hong
Kong and law enacted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
legislature.. ." provided they do not contradict the Basic Law. Any laws
enacted by the legislature of Hong Kong that are not in accordance with
the Basic Law are not valid.71 Part III discusses the judicial system for
the Hong Kong SAR.
Part XIII protects basic rights and freedoms that existed in Hong
Kong prior to the transition and these rights include "freedom of per-
son, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join
trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike of
demonstration..." 72 Part XIII further stipulates that the "International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall
67. Id. at para. 3. "Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of
the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike,
of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law
in the Hong Kong SAR. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of
inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law."
68. See Harris, supra note 19, at 350-51.
69. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. 1 ('Except for foreign and de-
fense affairs... the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with execu-
tive, legislative, and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.").
See generally RECORD, supra note 2, at 368-69 (discussing Annex I).
70. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. 1. The chief executive of the
Hong Kong SAR is to be "selected by election or through consultations held locally and be
appointed by the Central People's Government." The legislature of Hong Kong will be
established through elections and the chief executive will be accountable to the legislature
to certify that transactions are legal. See also Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
71. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. 2; RECORD, supra note 2, at 370.
Annex I, part 3 provides for the judicial processes in the Hong Kong SAR. The judges for
Hong Kong will be appointed by the chief executive of Hong Kong who will act "in accor-
dance with the recommendation of an independent commission composed of local judges,
persons from the legal profession and other eminent persons. Annex I part 3 further pro-
vides that the power of final judgment is to be vested in the court of final appeal in Hong
Kong. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. 3.
72. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. XIII. "The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided
for by the laws previously in force in Hong Kong..."
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remain in force."73
B. The Basic Law
As indicated by the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law was adopted
by the PRC's National People's Congress and is considered by Hong
Kong citizens to be the mini-constitution for the Hong Kong SAR.74 The
Basic Law reiterates the promises made in the Joint Declaration but
elaborates further on the actual law to uphold the promises made in the
Joint Declaration.
75
First, the Basic Law stipulates the rights of the Hong Kong peo-
ple.7 6 The Basic Law provides for the fundamental rights and duties of
the residents. These rights include a right to life, equality before the
law, freedom from torture, personal liberty, liberty of movement, pri-
vacy of communications, freedom of expression, religion, freedom of as-
sociation, and the right of peaceful assembly.
77
Second, the Basic Law establishes the plan of government for Hong
Kong.78 Continuing the theme of the Joint Declaration, the Preamble of
the Basic Law indicates "that under the principle of 'one country, two
systems" the socialist system and policies will not be practiced in HK."
9
Chapter IV details the political structure. Article 45, while discussing
the method for selection of the Chief Executive, stipulates that the ul-
timate goal is to elect the Chief Executive through universal suffrage.
80
Article 68 stipulates that another ultimate goal for change in Hong
Kong is to have a legislature that is elected by universal suffrage.81
73. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I, para. XIII.
74. See Vitrano, supra note 10, at 447; Jordan, supra note 31, at 335, 350. See also
RECORD, supra note 2, at 370 (discussing that the Basic Law "will become the Hong Kong
SAR's "constitution", replacing the Letters Patent, the document issued under the
Queen's hand that establishes the basic framework of the colonial government.") But see
Jordan, supra note 31, at 350-52 (indicating that China differs with Hong Kong as to the
perception that the Basic Law is a mini-constitution. China perceives the Basic Law as a
"non-enforceable statement of policy").
75. See Vitrano, supra note 10, at 447. See also RECORD, supra note 2, at 370.
76. See Harris, supra note 19, at 352; Jordan, supra note 31, at 335.
77. Basic Law, supra note 4, at ch. 3, arts. 24-42. Annex III to the Basic Law pro-
vides exceptions to the general rule that the national law of the PRC will not be applied to
Hong Kong. These exceptions include: 1) recognition of Beijing as the capital of the PRC;
2) "The March of Volunteers" as the National Anthem; 3) the Five-star red Flag as the
National Flag; 4) National Day falls on Oct. 1; 5) PRC's government's Declaration of the
Territorial Sea; 6) the PRC nationality law; and 7) PRC regulations concerning Diplo-
matic Privileges and Immunities.
78. See Harris, supra note 19, at 352; Jordan, supra note 31, at 335.
79. Basic Law, supra note 4, at pmbl (emphasis added). The assumption that Chi-
nese and English are interchangeable is flawed and causes much difficulty for interpreta-
tion. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 339.
80. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 45.
81. Id. at art. 68. Provisions in the Basic Law that indicate that the ultimate goal is
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However, the way the Basic Law was written allows China to ma-
nipulate Hong Kong's autonomy.8 2 Chapter I, Article 8 of the Basic Law
proscribes that the laws previously operable in Hong Kong will apply
only if they do not contravene with the Basic Law.8 3 If the Hong Kong
courts need to interpret a provision of the Basic Law, the Hong Kong
courts need to seek the relevant interpretation from the PRC Standing
Committee. Article 15884 dictates that it is the PRC Standing Commit-
tee's power to interpret the Basic Law. 85
universal suffrage imply that the political movement in Hong Kong SAR should be to-
wards democracy. Members of the democratic movement firmly believe that the Basic
Law stipulates that the path is to be towards democracy. See Martin Lee, The Slow
Squeeze on Hong Kong, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at A25.
82. See Davis, supra note 5, at 308 (discussing that early in the drafting of the Basic
Law, China seemed willing to incorporate varying political viewpoints including those of
liberals like Marline Lee, but following direct confrontation with these liberals, China re-
formed its policies and refused to incorporate liberals whose views opposed China's). The
Basic Law creates a huge gateway for China to influence the laws of Hong Kong. Gladys
Li Interview, supra note 8.
83. Basic Law, supra note 4, at ch. I, art. 8. See Bryan A. Gregory, Envisioning Fu-
tures, The Battle Over Democracy in Hong Kong, N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 175, 193
(1993) (indicating that "it is possible that the Standing Committee could legally imple-
ment or rescind procedures almost at will."). The Basic Law, Chapter I, Article 11 indi-
cates that "[t]he systems and policies practiced in the Hong Kong SAR, including the so-
cial and economic systems, the system for safeguarding the fundamental rights and
freedoms of its residents, the executive, legislative and judicial systems, and relevant
policies, shall be based on the provisions of this Law." The Basic Law, Chapter I, Article
11 further provides that "[t]he courts of the Hong Kong SAR shall have jurisdiction over
all cases in the Region, except.. .shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as de-
fense and foreign affairs .... But see Jordan, supra note 31, at 336 (stating that the
"ambiguity errs in favor of the common law interpretation", in other words the common
law of Hong Kong).
84. See Jordan, supra note 31, at 354 (stating that "Articles 17, 158, and
160... transfer considerable judicial powers of interpretation to the Standing Commit-
tee."). Since Article 158 gives complete power to the Standing Committee of the PRC to
interpret the Basic Law, by implication it gives the Standing Committee the power to dic-
tate which parts of the Basic Law are enforceable. Id. at 355. See Fung, supra note 51, at
301.
85. Basic Law, supra note 4, at ch. VIII, art 158. See also RECORD, supra note 2, at
370-71. See Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8. Article 158 of the Basic Law does not al-
low Hong Kong to have the "final say in the interpretation of the Basic Law" and it is un-
derstood that it is "undesirable" to make amendments to the Basic Law. The Standing
Committee delegates to the SAR courts the power to interpret the Basic Law if issues con-
cerning the Basic Law should arise in the course of litigation. If an issue should arise
which falls within the autonomy of the SAR, the SAR courts may interpret relevant provi-
sions of the Basic Law in the normal course of litigation up to the Court of Final Appeal.
Before the Court of Final Appeal delivers final judgment however, it must seek the review
of the Standing Committee of the NPC. The Standing Committee is then obliged to con-
sult a committee of constitutional experts know as the Committee for the Basic Law. It
consists of six mainland members and six Hong Kong members, including persons from
the legal profession, who will render an advisory opinion to the Standing Committee. The
Standing Committee will then make its interpretation, which will be binding on the Court
of Final Appeal. No interpretation of the Standing Committee affects judicial decisions
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Since no clear procedure indicates when a law contravenes with the
Basic Law, there is tremendous latitude for China to influence the laws
that will be allowed to continue to apply to Hong Kong. Additionally,
review by the National People's Congress of all of Hong Kong's laws to
determine if they violate the Basic Law undermines the autonomy of
Hong Kong and the ability for final adjudication.86 In further deroga-
tion of Hong Kong's autonomy, Article 17 maintains a similar procedure
for new law enacted by the Hong Kong legislature. Ultimately, when
Article 158 is read with Article 19, it gives the Standing Committee the
unreviewable power to determine what cases fall within the definition
of "acts of state" and thus outside of the jurisdiction of the SAR's
courts.
8 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF POST-TRANSITION HONG KONG
Within months of the transition, problems confronted the Hong
Kong people and challenged the efficacy of the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law.8 8 Current issues are multi faceted. One issue that de-
veloped immediately concerns the validity of the new governing legisla-
tive body.
8 9
Originally, the members of the former Hong Kong legislature, the
LegCo, were elected by more than one million people.90 However, after
the transition, LegCo was abolished by the Preparatory Committee 91
and replaced with the Provisional Council.92 The first startling element
of this action is that China threatened to take this drastic action in
1995. China had threatened to abolish the LegCo and established a leg-
already reached. In other words, such interpretations carry no retroactive effect.
86. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
87. See generally RECORD, supra note 2.
88. Since China refused to allow the Legislative Counsel to pass laws that would be
effective after July 1, 1997 and since the Basic Law has not been in effect long, there is no
clear body of law. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8. Over arching all of these considera-
tions, if China determines that the Standing Committee has the complete power to de-
termine which provisions of the Basic Law will be enforceable, this would be a breach of
China's guarantee that Hong Kong will be permitted to retain a great deal of autonomy.
See Jordan, supra note 31, at 355.
89. There are "grey" areas in terms of the recent "scrapping" of the Legislative Coun-
cil, which shed an uncertain shadow on the new legislature. Gladys Li Interview; supra
note 8; Jordan, supra note 31, at 336. But see H.K. Changes Little One Month After Han-
dover, BERNAMA (Malaysia), July 31, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12110903.
90. Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
91. The Preparatory Committee is body appointed entirely by China. It seems
unlikely that a group appointed entirely by China and not Hong Kong, will be able to ade-
quately represent the interests and needs of the Hong Kong people. In fact, the group will
more likely favor China's position on issues pertaining to basic rights. Huang & Qian,
supra note 6, at 292 n.9.
92. See Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
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islative body of its own appointment 93 in retaliation for the passage of
Hong Kong's Bill of Rights and the 1995 elections which resulted in ma-
jor victories for the pro-democracy party.94 China adamantly refused to
acknowledge the validity of the democratic reforms because, according
to China, they were directly contrary to the Joint Declaration.95
The second alarming issue related to this action is that the Provi-
sional Council members were appointed by China.96 As discussed ear-
lier, the Basic Law indicates that one goal for the Hong Kong SAR is
that Hong Kong should have a chief executive and legislature elected by
universal suffrage.97 The Basic Law provides for the establishment of
the new legislative body. 98 However, Annex II stipulates that the first
legislative body will be an exception to the rule, "formed in accordance
with the 'Decision of the National People's Congress on the Method for
the Formation of the First Government' and the First Legislative Coun-
cl.... ." This process takes a step backward from the goal expressed in
Article 68 of the Basic Law to have a legislature elected by universal
suffrage. 99 It also contravenes the Article 5 provision that the capitalist
93. Choo, supra note 19, at 72. See The Department of State, Hong Kong Report on
Human Rights Practice for 1996 (visited June 15, 1997)
<http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/hongkong.html>. This report indicates that the status
of human rights abuses in Hong Kong is included in the report for the United Kingdom.
The report acknowledges that the 60 LegCo. seats were filled in 1995 either through di-
rect or indirect balloting. They were contested by the PRC. The report indicates that the
PRC's intent for post-transition was to declare as null and void the 1995 LegCo, district
boards, and municipal counsels because it was not consistent with the electoral rules
adopted by the Hong Kong Government in 1994 for election to these bodies. The report
also indicates that China's design was to install a PRC appointed preparatory committee
to decide how to establish the first legislative counsel post July 1, 1997. The report issued
no statement as to these indications. See also Vitrano, supra, note 10, at 453-55 (indicat-
ing that if the PRC's discontinued the democratic reforms implemented by Governor
Patten, it would be a violation of the Joint Declaration).
94. See Choo, supra note 19, at 72.
95. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. China believed that the status quo in
Hong Kong at the time of the signing of the Joint Declaration should not be radically
changed by the United Kingdom.
96. Editorial Writer's Desk, Beijing-Style Democracy Hong Kong Will Have to Endure
a Convoluted Voting Scheme, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at B6 [hereinafter Beijing Style];
The cut in the number of office holding Democratic Party members such that they will not
hold the majority as they did before the reversion. This will result in more distance be-
tween the public and the government officials of Hong Kong, decreasing democracy.
When the Outline of Hong Kong's Electoral Arrangements was First, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 14,1997, at 18 [hereinafter Outline]. A decrease in democracy will mean that
the Hong Kong people will not be able to influence the administration of the laws pertain-
ing to their basic rights and increase the chances that China will abuse the loopholes in
the Basic Law.
97. Peter Montagnon, Legal Eagles Remain Wary, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 1997, at VII.
See also Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
98. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 68, Annex II.
99. But see Keith B. Richburg, 100 Days of Chinese Rule; Hong Kong's People Seem
Content as New Leader Promises Prosperity, Not Democracy, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at
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system will remain in place and practiced for the next fifty years. Since
this seems to violate the Basic Law's provisions, it is unclear whether
the new legislative body, the Provisional Legislature, is legally in
place.10o
Furthermore, it is also doubtful whether the legislative body will be
able to comply with the procedures laid out in the Basic Law. 0 1 Part of
the plan for the Provisional Legislative Council was to confirm the
judges appointed to the Court of Final Appeals. l0 2 Since the judges
were approved by the Provisional Legislature, whose legal existence is
in doubt, this creates doubt as to the legal validity of the judges on the
Court of Final Appeals.
103
Second, Tung Chee-Hwa, the new chief executive, canceled the laws
created by Governor Patten prior to July 1, 1997 that ensured basic
civil and political rights of Hong Kong residents.10 4 "As incrementally
and inevitably as pages being ripped from a daily calendar, Hong
Kong's new administration stripped away the fledgling rights and de-
mocratic reforms enacted during the last days of British rule."'105 As
contemplated by the Joint Declaration, these rights pertained to free-
dom of the press, public expression in government, right to peaceful
demonstration, and the movement towards democracy in Hong Kong.
A third possible violation is the new laws introduced by Tung fol-
lowing the reversion. These new laws limit the right to demonstration
and institute controls on political and other organizations. 106 The laws
have also weakened trade union rights by freezing labor laws, 0 7 limited
the right to protest, and limited the right to form political parties.
0 8
In August 1997, new election laws withdrew voting power from
A25 (construing Chief Executive Tung as having promised that a new legislature will be
established on May 24, 1998 but that more democracy will not occur for another 10 years).
100. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
101. Id.
102. Article 88 of the Basic Law indicates that the Chief Executive appoints the
judges. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 88. Article 73, paragraph 7 indicates that the
legislative council endorses appointments and removals. Id. at art. 73(7).
103. Gladys Li Interview, supra note 8.
104. Tung was appointed by China and therefore, would presumably have China's best
interests in mind. Maggie Farley, A Hundred Days in Hong Kong: A Matter of Haves,
Have-Nots, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at A4.
105. Id. These election laws were drawn up by the China-appointed Preparatory
Committee with the same motivations that lead the Committee to abolish LegCo and
make it more difficult for the pro-democracy candidates to obtain seats in the legislature.
See Lee, supra note 81, at A25; Eric Bjornlund, Hong Kong Election Law Fair?, CHRISTIAN
SC. MONITOR, Oct. 8, 1997, at 20.
106. See Flynn, supra note 29. Although no one has felt repercussions from these
laws, there is no guarantee that they won't tomorrow. Lee, supra note 82, at A25.
107. See Farley, supra note 104, at A4..
108. Id.
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close to 2 million Hong Kong citizens 09 and greatly crippled the democ-
ratic movement in China. 110 There are sixty seats in the legislature.
Now the electorate for thirty of those seats has been cut from 2.7 mil-
lion to 186,000111 and "corporate voting". 1 2 Furthermore, Tung is try-
ing to introduce further legislation that will additionally weaken the
democratic representation. 113 These new laws are directly in confronta-
tion to the Basic Law's guarantee to move towards democratic elec-
tions.
1 4
Fourth, Tung also called for a "watering down"'115 of the U.N. Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. 116 His reasoning was that the
U.N. Declaration was not representative of the beliefs of developing
countries. Instead, it represented the views of the West.1 7 Fifth, the
Human Rights Report of the State Department discussed the continu-
ing problem of self-censorship by the media. 118
However, before July 1, 1997, Great Britain and Hong Kong en-
deavored to insulate Hong Kong from China's lower standard of human
rights.11 9 According to the Joint Declaration 120 and the Basic Law, 121
the ICCPR and ICESC will remain applicable to Hong Kong following
109. See id.
110. See Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
111. See Outline, supra note 96, at 18.
112. See Beijing-Style, supra note 96, at B6 (indicating that "[alccording to the new
rules, Hong Kong will use a complex proportional representation system to prevent any
one party from dominating the 60-seat legislature. Under Beijing's scheme, 20 seats will
be filled at large by all voters and 30 seats will go to business representatives elected by a
smaller number, 180,000 people. The remaining 10 seats will be filled by an 800-member
electoral committee of pro-Beijing and business interests."); Lee, supra note 81.
113. See Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
114. Bjornlund, supra note 105, at 20.
115. See Lee, supra note 81, at A25.
116. See G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, Resns., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
117. Lee, supra note 81, at A25. But see Michael Chugani, Washington Urges More
Democracy, H.K. STANDARD, Sept. 10, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 14153419
(quoting Wang Yusheng, consul general of San Francisco, "Hong Kong's democracy, hu-
man rights, and freedom of the press have been increased and will be more extensive in
the future...")
118. See The Department of State, Hong Kong Report on Human Rights Practice for
1998 (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/human1998
/hongkong.html>. But see Richburg, supra note 99, at A25 (construing Chief Executive
Tung's speech as reassuring the Hong Kong people the freedom of the press and media).
A notorious issue was the release of cartoonist Larry Feign from the South China Morn-
ing Post in quick succession to his publication of cartoons that criticized PRC leaders. The
report indicates that although the South China Morning Post management vowed the car-
toonist's release was due to staff cuts, reports in Hong Kong remain convinced that his
release was politically motivated. Id.
119. Id.
120. Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at Annex I.
121. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 39
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the transition. 122 Article 39 of the Basic Law contains a policing
mechanism for checking the actions of China as pertaining to Hong
Kong. Article 39 of the Basic Law guarantees that the United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Na-
tions International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and the UN's international labor conventions shall remain applicable to
Hong Kong through the laws of the Hong Kong SAR. Any rights of the
Hong Kong citizens will not be restricted unless sanctioned by law and
those restrictions will not contravene the previously mentioned U.N.
conventions. 123
V. U.N. COVENANTS
A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Optional Protocol, December 16, 1966
1. Description of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
Although similar in content to the U.N. Declaration of Human
Rights, 124 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)125 goes further and requires State Parties to provide remedies
in the case of a Covenant violation. 126 "The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is one of the fundamental instruments created
by the international community for the global promotion and protection
of human rights."'127 The Covenant is binding on each State Party to
the Covenant, subject to reservations. 128
Part III of the Covenant enumerates the rights protected by the
ICCPR. Among these rights are the right to life, 129 freedom from forced
122. See Skeen, supra note 9, at 199-200.
123. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 39.
124. See generally B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FORTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION (1989) (discussing the Universal Declaration, its impact, and subsequent
actions).
125. The United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) was ratified on December 16, 1966 and went in to force on March 23, 1976.
ICCPR, supra note 16.
126. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
125 (1996).
127. UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, (1992), 31 ILM 645 [herein-
after SENATE REPORT].
128. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 123. There are disputes between
States as to the interpretation of terms of the Covenant. Id.
129. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 6, sec. 1.
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servitude and slavery, 130 liberty and security of persons, 131 liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence, 132 freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion,133 to hold opinions without interference,134 to
freedom of expression, 135 peaceful assembly, 136 to take part in the con-
duct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representa-
tives, 137 to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret bal-
lot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors, 138 and to
have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his coun-
try. 3 9 It is the responsibility of each State to ensure that all of the
Covenant measures are implemented appropriately. 40
The ICCPR provides three means to guarantee that the Covenant's
provisions are properly respected and ensured by State Parties. As Ar-
ticle 40 provides, State Parties must periodically provide reports to the
Human Rights Commission (HRC)14' illustrating the progress made to
enhance those rights and the measures taken by the State to ensure the
provisions of the Covenant. 142 The reports must be submitted within
one year of becoming a party to the Covenant. 143
HRC members dispute over the uncertain role of specialized agen-
cies and non-government organizations (NGOs) in this reporting proce-
dure. The Covenant does not contain any provision for consideration of
this type of outside information. 44 The specialized agencies may only
130. Id. at art 8, sec. 1
131. Id. at art 9, sec. 1
132. Id. at art 12, sec. 1
133. Id. at art 18, sec. 1
134. Id. at art 19, sec. 1
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at art 25, sec. a
138. Id. at art 25, sec. b.
139. Id. at art 25, sec. c.
140. UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 149 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer, eds., 1993) [hereinafter Hannum &
Fischer].
141. The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations was created entirely for the
purpose of being the administrator of the ICCPR. See DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: IT'S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 126 (1991); Hannum & Fischer, supra note
140, at 149. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126.
142. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 40. According to Article 40, the State Party reports
must be periodically filed with the HRC and must indicate "(1) measures [the State] ha[s]
adopted, including legislative or judicial action, which give effect to the rights recognized
within the Covenant; (2) the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights; and (3) the
factors and difficulties encountered in giving them effect." See Hannum & Fischer, supra
note 140, at 151.
143. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 40
144. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 153. A purely textual analysis would
indicate that specialized agencies have no opportunity to comment on reports provided by
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provide comment when it is requested by the HRC. However, past
practice has indicated that although formal reports are not permitted,
work produced by specialized agencies of the U.N. has influenced HRC
decisions. 145 Likewise, since there is no specific Covenant provision
that prohibits or permits formal reporting by NGOs, NGOs are not pre-
vented from providing information and statistics to individual members
of the Committee. Recently, the HRC has frequently relied on the in-
formation provided by NGOs such as Amnesty International.
146
After all of this information is assimilated, the HRC is able to pro-
vide only "general comments" to the parties on the reports filed by each
State Party.147 More importantly, however, the HRC fies an annual
report148 on its activities for publication with the General Assembly.
149
In this manner, it is available to inform the rest of the international
community.
A second method of ensuring that the Covenant is respected is
through Article 41 of the Covenant, which provides an optional inter-
State complaint procedure. 150 This procedure permits one State Party
to execute a communication to the HRC that another State Party is not
ensuring the provisions of the Covenant.' 5 ' This process under is not
automatically available. 152 A State Party to the ICCPR must file a
separate declaration that it "recognizes the competence of the HRC to
receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party
claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the
present Covenant."153 Furthermore, only a State Party that has ac-
cepted Article 41 can report a violation by another State Party of the
Covenant. 154 The accusing State Party must have exhausted all domes-
tic remedies; and both parties must first try to settle the dispute
amongst themselves. 155 If these conditions are met, then a State Party
may file a communication alleging that the accused State is not fulfill-
the State Parties. The content of the report is a description and evaluation, consistent
with the ICCPR terms, of the protections measures for civil and political rights enumer-
ated in the Covenant in the State Party under scrutiny. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at
9.
145. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 153.
146. See id. at 153-54.
147. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 131 (stating that according to Articles
40 & 45 of the ICCPR, general comments should be submitted to the U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral).
148. McGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at 131 (indicating that the annual reports not con-
tain information about Optional Protocal reports).
149. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 154.
150. See ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 41.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 155.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 156.
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ing its obligations under the Covenant. 156 Inter-State communications
are rare.
157
If the alleged violation reaches the HRC, the HRC can not opine as
to whether there has been a violation of the Covenant. The HRC's pur-
pose is to be a fact-finder and to assist in friendly settlement between
the accused and the accused state. I5 8 If a settlement is not reached, the
State Parties may agree to the appointment of an ad hoc conciliation
commission, which will also assist towards a friendly settlement. 159 If a
settlement still is not reached, the HRC submits a report with its posi-
tion on the likelihood and means toward a friendly settlement.
Third, the Optional Protocol (OP)160 provides an opportunity for an
individual citizen or an individual subject to the control of a State to file
a communication with the HRC against his or her State Party. 161 Even-
tually, the General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to provide
for individual petition, 162 but NGOs were still denied the right of peti-
tion.163 The OP is a separate agreement from the ICCPR, requiring the
State Party to assent to the OP and the ICCPR separately. Therefore,
the Human Rights Commission is only allowed to consider petitions
from individuals alleging an ICCPR violation by a State Party if the
State Party is a signatory to the ICCPR and the OP.164
156. Id. at 155.
157. Id. at 156-57.
158. Id. at 156.
159. Id. (indicating this is done according to procedure laid out in Article 42).
160. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL (Vol. 1: U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.2, 1985; Vol. 2: U.N. Sales No. E.89-XIV.1,
1990). Originally, the final draft of the ICCPR by the Human Rights Commission con-
tained no provisions for petitions by individuals or organizations. However, many argued
that States were not the only actors affected by international law. International persons
and organizations were affected as well. "[Under the very terms of the Covenant the in-
dividual was plainly a subject of international law and the purpose of the Covenant was to
protect him against abuses of power by the State." McGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at 122.
161. HuMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, supra note 160, at 9-10. STEINER & ALSTON, supra
note 126, at 776. "[A] failure to allow individual complaints to be brought to the Commit-
tee under the first Optional Protocol, all the essential elements of the Covenant guaran-
tees have been removed." Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 149. The UN Secretary
General determines whether communications pursuant to the OP are submitted to the
HRC. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at 128.
162. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 141, at 124.
163. See id. at 125. The Human Rights Commission is the administrator for the
ICCPR and Optional Protocol; although, it is important to clarify that they are separate
agreements. Id. at 126. There are no explicit rules as to which submissions the Secretary
General may or may not determine are submissable to the HRC. However, there is an
explicit rule that stipulates that any communications against a State that is not a party to
the OP will not be determined reviewable by the HRC because the HRC would not have
jurisdiction. Id. at 128.
164. Id. at 124. "The OP is open for signature by any State that has signed the ICCPR
(Article 8(1) OP). It can only be ratified or acceded to by a State which has ratified by or
acceded to the ICCPR (article 8(2)(3) OP)... For States subsequently ratifying or acceding
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As dictated by Article 4(1), following submission, the individual
communication is brought to the attention of the State Party against
which it was brought. The State Party must reply within six months by
providing a submission to the HRC.165 It is also the State Party's bur-
den to prove, in detail, that the individual did not exhaust the remedies
available to settle the issue. 166 Once the HRC has considered the com-
munication, the HRC states its "views on the matter", which includes
the HRC legal analysis of the issue and a determination whether a vio-
lation of the Covenant occurred.
167
2. Application
"An important part of Hong Kong's [pre-transition] legal system de-
rives from international treaties."168 In the past, international treaties
were applicable to Hong Kong either through the terms of the treaties
or through the British legislative process. 169 However, Hong Kong's re-
version to China rendered this process obsolete170 and a fledgling sys-
tem has been established in its place. In order for a State Party, like
China, to adhere to the terms of the ICCPR, the State's laws might have
to be revised to meet these standards. 171 China might have to establish
enforcement mechanisms if none exist.17 2 The principal means to
achieve implementation of the ICCPR is through legislation or judicial
remedies.1
73
Based on China's approval of the ICCPR in Article 39 of the Basic
to the OP, the OP enters into force three months after the date of the deposit of the in-
strument of ratification or accession (article 9(2) OP)." Id. at 126-27. In order for an indi-
vidual to provide a communication to the Human Rights Commission regarding a viola-
tion of the ICCPR, it must be submitted in written form according to Article 2 of the
Optional Protocol. Article 2 and 5 (2)(b) of the Optional Protocol indicate that all domestic
remedies must have been attempted and not achieved the proper result before an individ-
ual petition would be considered. According to Article 3, any communications to the HRC
that are anonymous, or that the HRC considers to be an abuse of the communication or
inconsistent with the purpose of the Covenant, will not be considered by the HRC. Id. at
125.
165. Id.
166. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 159. Article 4 (2) further explains that
the State Party's submission can be "[w]ritten explanations or statements clarifying the
matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State".
167. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 160.
168. See Skeen, supra note 9, at 188.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. STEINER & AISTON, supra note 126, at 775.
172. Id. Reservations by the State Party to terms of the Covenant would reduce the
requirement for domestic legal changes. Compliance would be rendered obsolete as to re-
served terms. Id. at 775.
173. Id. at 269. As we have seen before, the validity of the legislature and judiciary in
Hong Kong is already in question.
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Law, the following four examples are current violations which could be
determined to violate the ICCPR. First, Article I of the ICCPR estab-
lishes that all "peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pur-
sue their economic, social, and cultural development." 17 4 Hong Kong's
right to self-determination was quashed by China, when the UN Special
Committee accepted China's request to remove Hong Kong from the list
of colonies covered by Article I of the ICCPR.
175
Second, the ICCPR's guarantee that people have a right to take
part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives, 176 would challenge China's actions regarding the recent
alteration in election laws that took Hong Kong one step further away
from democracy. 77 By reducing the electorate, the ability of the Hong
Kong people to participate in public affairs has been diminished.
Third, the ICCPR ensures the right to vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suf-
frage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expres-
sion of the will of the electors. 178 Members of the democratic party in
Hong Kong would be among the first people to claim China's violation of
the terms of election and the guarantee to move toward universal suf-
frage.
Fourth, the ICCPR upholds the civil and political rights guaranteed
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1 79 The rights protected
in the ICCPR are the key composites of a democratic society. 80 Tung's
weakening of the force of the Declaration is counter to the ICCPR.
In response to these derogations of the ICCPR, there are four pos-
sible scenarios to ensure or attempt to ensure compliance with the
ICCPR. First, if everything was ideal, the ICCPR would be applied to
the Hong Kong SAR as it was applicable under United Kingdom's ad-
ministration. Article 39 of the Basic Law and Annex I, part XIII of the
Joint Declaration stipulate China's approval of the ICCPR as it applied
to Hong Kong at the time those agreements were ratified. Originally,
Great Britain adopted the ICCPR and extended its application to Hong
Kong.' 8 ' The tradition would continue and China would provide reports
to the HRC once a year following the first year after July 1, 1997. If
174. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. I.
175. See Neoh, supra note 10, at 323-23.
176. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 25, sec. a.
177. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
178. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 25, sec. b.
179. SENATE REPORT, supra note 127, at 649.
180. Id.
181. LIESBETH LUNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY OR
RUIN? 275 (1995). There are reservations made by the United Kingdom for Hong Kong as
to Articles 13 and 25.
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this were the most likely situation, this research would be unnecessary.
A second scenario is imaginable if China does not comply with the
reporting requirement, and the ICCPR is applied to the Hong Kong
SAR as it was applied under the United Kingdom's rule. Great Britain
made a declaration as to its acceptance of the "competence of the Hu-
man Rights Committee under Article 41" of the ICCPR. 182 If the
United Kingdom's declarations carried forward past the reversion, an-
other State Party to the Covenant, with similar acceptance of Article
41, could bring a communication to the Human Rights committee claim-
ing that China was not fulfilling the terms of the ICCPR. For example,
as part of the United States consideration for ratification of the ICCPR,
it considered the resulting influence the U.S. would have upon shaping
human rights development in other countries.1 8 3 Therefore, under Arti-
cle 41 the United States would be able to provide reports if it had ac-
cepted Article 41 as well.
The Optional Protocol would not be applicable to the Hong Kong
SAR because the United Kingdom was not a party nor a signatory to
the Optional Protocol and therefore, an individual could not file com-
plaints against the United Kingdom.
18 4
A third scenario would be if China insisted that its acceptance of
the ICCPR did not include Article 41, and China refused to comply with
the reporting requirements. The chief executive of Hong Kong might be
able to provide reports on behalf of the Hong Kong SAR to the HRC.
Additionally, NGOs could effectively protect rights such as freedom of
speech, association and participation.18 5 To draw a parallel, in 1995
Amnesty International submitted a report to the Human Rights Com-
mission concerning the abuses of human rights in Kashmir.186 Prior to
this report, the Indian government had denied the truth of allegations
of human rights abuses. 187 However, this report angered the Indian
government and spurred the government to provide its own reports and
take action to enforce these rights.188
However, China included Article 23 in the Basic Law, which limits
the "foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political
activities in the Region" or those same organizations from establishing
ties with similar organizations in the Region.18 9 It remains unclear
182. ICCPR, supra note 16, at Declarations
183. SENATE REPORT, supra note 127, at 659.
184. See supra notes160-64 and accompanying text.
185. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 463.
186. Abuse of Human Rights Commission, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 4, 1995, at 30.
187. Id.
188. Id. However, the article further indicates that although Amnesty International
got this reaction from India, the UN Commission on Human Rights did not assume the
influential role it could have.
189. Basic Law, supra note 4, at art. 23.
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whether China intended for this article to apply to NGOs. 190
Fourth, the worst and most likely scenario, China will refuse to
comply with the reporting procedure for the ICCPR or acknowledge its
application to Hong Kong. China would insist that Article 39 of the Ba-
sic Law was merely a recognition of the ICCPR as an international con-
vention but that Article 39 in no way bound China. Already, China
adamantly refuses to acknowledge an intergovernmental organization's,
like the U.N., authority over human right issues that are specifically
State concerns.1 91 The Government of China maintains a doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity192 and emphatically denies that the
ICCPR is enforceable through Article 39 of the Basic Law. 193 "It seems
pretty clear, that a suit against the PRC, or against its top officials,
would be regarded as violating the basic principles of the laws of the
PRC."'194 According to Chinese law, the PRC court could reject a matter
issued by a foreign court because it was incompatible with the sover-
eignty or security of the People's Republic of China. 95 Furthermore,
the Basic Law indicates that China will determine whether interna-
tional agreements to which it is a party will apply to Hong Kong. 196
Overarching all of these concerns is the questionable competency of
the HRC to address human rights violations. If China does not comply,
the HRC does not have recourse. Even if China does file a report with
the Committee, there is no guarantee that it will be accurate. 197 The
petition mechanism, 9 8 whereby another State Party or individual may
submit reports, may increase the accuracy of the reports.
Finally, and most importantly, the HRC can only provide reports
and appropriate general comments to the Parties. The Committee has
no police power. 199 The matter may be further referred, with prior con-
190. See Davis, supra note 5, at 315.
191. Vitrano, supra note 10, at 458. Great Britain is a party to the Joint Declaration
which was registered with the U.N. Britain could submit a complaint to the U.N. con-
cerning a violation by China. As an additional measure, the United States, even as a
third State Party, could submit a complaint to the U.N. on the behalf of Hong Kong or de-
fending its own, the United States', interests.
192. Platto & Horton, supra note 30, at 20.
193. Jordan supra note 31, at 367-68. China is inconsistent in its approach to human
rights in Hong Kong. It insists that the BRO is unnecessary because the Basic Law pro-
vides all of the necessary safeguards for human rights so this "implies that Article 39 of
the Basic Law and other rights provisions in the Basic Law are directly enforceable." Id.
194. Platto & Horton, supra note 30, at 20.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. MATHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS 31 (1995) (stating that "[r]eporting systems are dependent, to a large
extent, upon the good faith of the States concerned.")
198. See id at 32 (stating that a petition mechanism is "generally considered the most
effective means for the protection of human rights.").
199. Timothy Jones, Fundamental Rights in Australia and Britain, in
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sent by the Parties, to an appointed ad hoc Conciliation Commission.
The Commission, also, does not have policing powers, instead, they en-
deavor to reach an "amicable solution".
200
The ICCPR, like its counterpart the ICESCR, does not have any po-
lice mechanism but it does serve as a gatherer and conveyor of informa-
tion. This will be an important function to notify the rest of the com-
munity that China is not upholding its promises.
B. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
1. Description of the ICESCR
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) entered into force on January 3, 1976.201 The
ICESCR's obligations are primarily listed in Article 2 as well as other
provisions of Part I and Part 111.202 Among the rights included in the
ICESCR are the right to work,20 3 to "just and favourable" work condi-
tions,204 to form trade unions and strike,205 to the greatest protection for
the family unit, 20 6 to education, 20 7 and to participate in cultural life. 20 8
While the ICCPR requires State Parties to "respect and ensure"20 9
rights, the ICESCR necessitates that States should "take steps, indi-
vidually and through international assistance and cooperation.... to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving pro-
gressively the full realisation of the rights."210 This principle in Article
2 is generally called the principle of progressive implementation. 211
Most of the rights set forth in the ICESCR, as opposed to the ICCPR,
are positive rights that require affirmative government action to ensure
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS 91, 104 (Conor Gearty & Adam Tomkins, eds., 1996)
(stating that "[t]he Committee is not a judicial body; it is not a Supreme Court of Human
Rights. Nor are the views expressed by the Committee legally binding. Nor are there any
means of enforcement, apart from the Committee's moral authority and the potential
pressure of public opinion.").
200. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art 7(a)
201. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 410 (1995).
202. See Id. at pt. I, pt. III, & art 2.
203. Id. at art 6
204. Id. at art 7
205. Id. at art 8.
206. Id. at art 10.
207. Id. at art 13.
208. Id. at art 15.
209. ICCPR, supra note 16, at art. 2(1).
210. ICESCR, supra note 17, at art. 2. See Geraldine Van Bueren, International Hu-
man Rights Law, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS 596, 598 (Conor Gearty & Adam
Tomkins, eds., 1996).
211. Van Bueren, supra note 210, at 598.
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these rights.2 12 These government actions will require the use of scarce
resources, and the availability of these resources directly determines
the ability of the State Party to comply with the terms of the
ICESCR.
213
The ICESCR has a mandatory reporting procedure for State Par-
ties that ratified the Covenant. 21 4 Similar to the ICCPR State reports,
these State reports are designed to indicate the measures instituted by
the State Party to uphold the Covenant rights and the progress made
towards achieving the standards. If a State has difficulty meeting the
standards, it should indicate this in the report with the reasons for its
noncompliance. 21 5 Within two years of ratification of the ICESCR, a
State Party must submit an initial report. These reports are submitted
to the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).216 An additional
report is required every five years thereafter. 217 When a State does not
submit a report or is tardy in its submission, the ECOSOC includes this
in its report to the Secretary-General. 218 If there is no State report and
no one has been identified that should have compiled the report, an in-
dividual from the Committee is delegated to develop a report of the im-
portant and relevant issues.
219
No specific committee or review group was established to evaluate
the ICESCR reports.220 According to Articles 16 through 22, enforce-
ment of the Covenant is to be administered by ECOSOC.221 In 1985,
the ECOSOC established the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ESCC) to review the Covenant Reports.222 The ESCC car-
ries forth three primary objectives for the ICESCR: (1) development of
standards for evaluation of the rights recognized in the Covenant; (2)
catalyzing State Parties' ability to uphold the rights and to confront
212. Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 163-64. Civil and political rights are nega-
tive rights because the state must only refrain from committing a violation of those rights.
Van Bueren, supra note 210, at 599. "The Human Rights Committee has, however,
pointed to the positive duties involved in protecting the right to life . I..." d
213. Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 164-65.
214. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 316 (reports must be consistent with the
"reporting guidelines").
215. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 38.
216. See infra note 214; CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 38 (indicating that the Commis-
sion on Human Rights may also review these reports).
217. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 264.
218. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 59.
219. Id. at 59-60 (indicating that in some situations this technique has proven success-
ful)
220. The ICCPR established the Human Rights Commission to review the ICCPR re-
ports. Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 262.
221. Id.
222. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 264 (indicating that "[i]ts principal activi-
ties are the adoption of 'general comments' and the examination of states parties' reports
leading to the adoption by the Committee of 'concluding observations' thereon.").
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those State Parties that do not comply; and (3) ensuring that State Par-
ties comply with the standards.
223
Since the 1990s, however, there has been a pile up of State reports
to be reviewed, so specialized agencies of the U.N. have also become in-
volved in the review process. 224 These review bodies have the ability to
make recommendations according to the State reports. Article 22 per-
mits the ECOSOC to apprise other U.N. bodies of the status of a State's
report in order to more effectively guarantee that the Covenant provi-
sions are upheld.
225
As a part of the reporting procedure, the Covenant has a mecha-
nism for input from NGOs and specialized agencies. 226 "State Parties
and specialized agencies may comment to ECOSOC on any such rec-
ommendations." 227 Article 18 provides that specialized agencies may
provide updates on progress made by the States towards achieving the
standards. 228 The Covenant does not include any other provisions for
outside contributions such as specialized agencies participating in the
evaluation of the reports or other groups providing reports. 229 However,
the Committee has invited all parties concerned with the issues to sub-
mit information. 2
30
Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not have an Optional Protocol
allowing for individuals to communicate a violation by a State Party of
the ICESCR.231 Over the years since its adoption, there have been mo-
tions to provide for a similar method of individual petition. Thus far
there has been no success. 232
2. Application
Unlike the ICCPR, any violation by China of the ICESCR will not
be immediately perceptible. The ICESCR mandates progressive pro-
grams that do not necessitate immediate results. Thus, the ICESCR
will require compliance from China over time. China's obligation is to
reach an end result. This will require that China implement programs
that assure economic, societal and cultural rights will be preserved.
223. CRAVEN, supra note 197. See also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 316.
224. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 263.
225. See id. at 264.
226. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 355.
227. See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 140, at 264.
228. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 76.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 76-77 (indicating that the Committee's Rules of Procedure clearly include
the specialized agencies as part of the evaluative process of State reports). The Commit-
tee also passed a resolution that allows for NGOs to submit written reports and make oral
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Over time, if this does not occur, then there are grounds for complaint
and action. Here are two examples of areas where China might be re-
miss in the future.
First, according to Article 2(2) of the ICESCR, there is a provision
against discrimination based on national origin.233 China might aggra-
vate this provision, if, while hiring people for Hong Kong government
jobs, China discriminates against Hong Kong-born Chinese versus Chi-
nese mainland born Chinese. China would not have as much leeway for
non-compliance compared to other ICESCR provisions. The elimination
of discrimination does not require as many resources as other ICESCR
provisions do for compliance. 234 In fact, compliance can be attained
with barely any resources at all. A history of certain types of discrimi-
nation may actually justify or necessitate the implementation of af-
firmative action programs. 235
A second compliance issue could be equality of opportunity for all,
according to Article 7(c) and 1(2)(c) of the ICESCR.236 If the trend con-
tinues that democrats are stymied from obtaining public office positions
due to the new election laws, this may be actionable inequality of oppor-
tunity. When the UN Committee evaluates China's compliance with
the ICESCR, it will consider measures taken by the legislature to de-
termine whether china is adequately using its resources to reach its ul-
timate goal. On the contrary, Hong Kong legislative action has, in fact,
cut back the electorate with the effect of legislating against election of
democrats. China is currently not directing its resources to reach an
ultimate goal of equal opportunity.
In the years to come, the prediction of China's violations of the
ICESCR may become reality. However, the applicability of the ICESCR
to the Hong Kong situation may be bogged down by peripheral issues.
The ICESCR will probably be second-in-line to the ICCPR as a UN en-
forcement mechanism alternative because the trend in international fa-
vors the importance of civil and political rights over economic, social
and cultural rights.237 For this reason, often the rights in the ICESCR
have been termed "non-justiciable" or "programmatic" 238 and the great-
est challenge facing the ICESCR is ensuring enforcement of its provi-
sions. 239
233. ICESCR, supra note 17, at art 2(2).
234. See generally id (discussing various rights protected by the ICESCR and the re-
source issues pursuant to compliance).
235. Id.
236. See ICESCR, supra note 17, at arts. 7 & 1(2).
237. Van Bueren, supra note 210, at 599; CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 9 (indicating that
in reality these rights are "ignored").
238. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 353.
239. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 268-69 (indicating that one of the greatest
difficulties to ensure compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Ini-
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Another difficulty relates to the ICESCR's insufficient reporting
mechanisms. Although the reporting procedure is the best method for
monitoring a particular human rights record,240 in general, the history
of reporting by State Parties to the Covenant has been poor.24' This
begs the question, then why should China submit reports? State Par-
ties that do not contest the applicability of the Covenant are negligent
to comply with the reporting requirement. China, who is loath to accept
the applicability of the Covenant, therefore, will have no compunction
ignoring the reporting requirement.
Under the ICCPR, if the State Party did not provide reports, there
were alternatives. However, the ICESCR does not offer solutions like
the Optional Protocol or Article 41. The ICESCR does provide for par-
ticipation by NGOs. However, NGOs may not be as effective advocating
economic, social and cultural rights as they are for advocating civil and
political rights.242 First, the NGOs, in practice, are reluctant to advo-
cate economic, social, and cultural rights alone. 243 Second, even if a
NGO may pursue upholding these rights, the actual enforcement of the
terms of the ICESCR requires a state to have available resources.244
The availability of resources is not controllable by the NGO.
A third deficiency of the effectiveness of the ICESCR is the impre-
cise language of the Covenant. Although the Covenant indicates that
"appropriate means" must be used to protect the rights in the ICESCR,
the Covenant does not identify those means.245 The legislative and ju-
dicial methods recommended for enforcement of the ICCPR may not
suffice for the ICESCR.246 Once again, the lack of development of en-
forcement mechanisms for economic, social and cultural rights, as com-
pared to civil and political rights, can be attributed to the relative lack
of concern in the international arena.
247
tially one of the greatest challenges to the ICESCR was whether economic rights were
really rights. This issue has been settled. Id.
240. CRAVEN, supra note 197, at 33.
241. Id. at 57 (indicating that 14 States have not produced one report in 10 years).
242. But see id. at 32. The means of petition are considered among the most effective
ways to protect human rights.
243. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 269-70. A tug of war exists over whether
or not economic, social, and cultural rights are really rights. Thus, NGOs are often not
apt to pursue something that might not be a right.
244. Id. at 271-72 (quoting Louis Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in
the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (Theodore Meron, et. al,
1984).
245. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 126, at 268-69.
246. Id. at 269.
247. Id. (indicating the reasons are "1) the ambivalence of most governments, but par-
ticularly those from the Third World; 2) the demonstrated reluctance of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to focus specifically on economic and social rights; and 3) the lack of
innovative legal and other approaches to implementation by those governments that
clearly do support the concept.")
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VI. CONCLUSION
The ICCPR and IECSCR are both applicable to the Hong Kong
SAR. The Joint Declaration, an international agreement that has been
registered with the U.N., is proof of this intent by both the United
Kingdom and China.248 Furthermore, the Basic Law, written by China,
characterizes this provision as a promise to the- Hong Kong people.
The Joint Declaration establishes China's international legal duty
to administer Hong Kong pursuant to the provisions of the Declara-
tion.249 The primary purpose of an international treaty is that it serves
as reliable proof that each party to the treaty is bound to its provisions
and must fulfill them in good faith.250 If China does not uphold its
promises in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law to maintain the
capitalist system in Hong Kong for the next fifty years and to pursue a
plan for greater democracy, the international community could resort to
the UN Covenants.
The primary obstacle, as we have seen is that these Covenants can
do little more than serve as conduits for protest and dialogue. The
Committees to the Covenants have very little judgment power and no
police power. However, this is not as ineffective as it may seem. It is
important that the international community is aware that China is not
upholding its promises, that there are human rights violations. Reports
that the Committees provide to the Secretary-General of the UN will
provide notice that collective action needs to be taken. Collective ac-
tion, countries working in concert, will be the ideal means through
which Hong Kong's human rights will be secured.
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248. See Neoh, supra note 10, at 327 n.78 (quoting The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at art. 2(1)(a). Article 2(1)(a) defines
a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation.").
249. Skeen, supra note 9, at 178.
250. Vienna Convention, supra note 248, at art. 26. An international treaty takes
precedence over internal law. "Primary responsibility for carrying out treaty obligations
rests with States Parties." Id.
251. Maleiha Malik, Communal Goods as Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN
RIGHTS, 138, 141 (Conor Gearty & Adam Tomkins, eds. 1996).
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